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Abstract
This paper focuses on bank rescue packages and on the behaviour of troubled
banks in light of rescue oﬀers. A puzzling feature of experience with banking crises
is that in many cases policy authorities make oﬀers of bank rescue, and banks are
reluctant to accept these oﬀers. We study situations in which regulators have decided
to oﬀer bank rescue plans, and we show that a combination of factors, including
bankers’ reputational concerns, can explain banks’ potential reluctance to accept
oﬀers of recapitalisation.
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11 Introduction
In the 1980s and 1990s banking sector problems, frequently escalating to crisis level, have
become common. Lindgren, Garcia et al, (1996) estimated that in the decade and a half to
the early 1990s over 130 countries experienced some degree of ﬁnancial diﬃculty. Of these,
thirty six countries were judged to have experienced a banking crisis. Importantly, these
countries were not all developing and emerging market economies. After the Asian crisis
of 1997 to 1998 several large Asian countries can now be added to the list.
Despite the frequency with which banking crises occur, relatively few formal analyses
of regulatory responses to crises have been undertaken. This paper focuses on bank rescue
packages and on the behaviour of troubled banks in light of rescue oﬀers.
Much of the literature on bank regulatory policy suggests that bank rescues are inef-
ﬁcient and can worsen banking sector problems. The whole tenor of Prompt Corrective
Action type regulation is to avoid having to bail out inadequately capitalised banks (see
Bentson and Kaufman, 1997) and it may well be that this is a ﬁrst-best policy response.
In many cases of systemic banking crises, however, it is already too late for this type of
policy response.1 Policy makers are faced with the need to recapitalise banking systems
to avoid credit crunches and premature liquidations of performing projects, along with
non-performing, if many banks become insolvent. This is the main reason that IMF ad-
vice frequently sanctions bank restructuring packages which involve an element of bank
recapitalisation.
It is a puzzling fact, however, that in many cases policy authorities make oﬀers of bank
rescue plans, yet banks are reluctant to accept these oﬀers. In recent years Thailand and
Japan stand out as examples where government oﬀers of recapitalisation have been received
unenthusiastically by private banks. Yet the failure to get banks to recapitalise, and to
restructure and write-oﬀ non-performing loans, has been one reason for poor performance
in the real economy in both cases. On the other hand Norway, Sweden, and Korea provide
examples where recapitalisation was achieved quite swiftly. This paper oﬀers an explanation
for these international diﬀerences that diﬀers from potential explanations suggested by the
existing literature.
1We are not suggesting that recapitalisation is a substitute for PCA and improved bank regulation.
Once the short-term systemic crisis has been dealt with the usual ﬁrst-best policy advice would apply.
2We analyse a situation in which regulators have decided to oﬀer bank rescue plans, and
show that a combination of factors, including the quality of the bank supervisory system
and bankers’ reputational concerns, can explain banks’ potential reluctance to accept oﬀers
of recapitalisation. The analysis rests on the idea that there is asymmetric information
between banks and regulators and between banks and the market regarding the amount
of bad debts on banks’ balance sheets. Banks may (and regularly do) hide the amount
of bad debt on their balance sheets by rolling over and rescheduling loans that are in
default. Banks’ rollovers of defaulting loans not only disguise the banks’ true ﬁnancial
states but also may exacerbate banking sector problems and impose costs on the real
economy. In these circumstances it is less costly to have banks accept recapitalisation.2
We show, however, that there may be equilibria in which banks have incentives to reject
recapitalisation and continue with loan rollovers. Banks’ willingness to accept a government
oﬀer of recapitalization will depend upon the terms of the oﬀer, but it will also depend upon
the eﬀect on banks’ reputations. The reputational eﬀect may itself be a function of whether
other banks are accepting recapitalization.
This paper is related to two areas of literature. One set of papers to which the paper
is indirectly related addresses the policy maker’s decision on when and whether to close
a bank, assuming symmetric information between banks and regulators (and all other
outsiders) regarding the ﬁnancial health of the bank at the point where the regulator
must make the closure decision.3 (See, for example, Boot and Thakor (1993), Mailath
and Mester (1994), Dreyfus, Saunders, and Allen (1994) and Rochet and Tirole (1996).)
While the assumption of symmetric information is probably realistic for the case of an
individual bank in diﬃculty, we believe it is less so in the case of widespread banking sector
problems, or when a crisis is brewing. In the latter case authorities often have to decide
whether or not to allow for bank rescues before undertaking detailed investigations of the
potentially troubled banks in the banking system. In many recent crises the decision to
create an independent ﬁnancial supervisory agency with the power to investigate banks’
books has been part of a package of bank restructuring policies which also included the
2Krueger and Tornell (1999) point out that a lesson from Mexican experience is that “recovery is not
possible unless the banking system has been ‘ﬁxed’. If there are sizeable portions of banks’ portfolios that
are nonperforming, the banks themselves cannot extend new loans at reasonable rates.”
3This is the theoretical literature which underpins the design of policies like PCA.
3oﬀer of recapitalisation, so that detailed examination of banks could not have preceded the
recapitalisation oﬀer.4
This paper is more closely related to a second, small set of papers studying regulatory
response to troubled banks in the presence of asymmetric information. (See Mitchell (1998a,
1998b), and Aghion, Bolton, and Fries (1998).)5 These papers, like ours, focus on banks’
treatment of their nonperforming loans. By establishing the incentives for banks to roll
over nonperforming loans, this literature complements abundant anecdotal evidence of this
practice.6 Mitchell (1998a) shows that when regulators adopt a laissez-faire policy towards
troubled banks and when managers of insolvent banks would lose private beneﬁts if the
bank’s insolvency were discovered, then insolvent banks will roll over their defaulting loans
in order to hide their insolvency.7
An obvious policy question is whether regulators can induce accurate revelation by
banks of their bad loans by oﬀering to recapitalise banks (assuming that the bank managers
who accept the recapitalisation are not dismissed). Mitchell (1998b) analyses a regulator’s
oﬀer of bank rescues, and its eﬀect on banks’ revelation of nonperforming loans, when the
rescue oﬀer occurs in response to a situation labeled “too many to fail.” Although insolvent
banks will have the incentive to reveal their bad loans, solvent but troubled banks may roll
4In the Swedish banking crisis of the early 1990s, the Bank Support Authority was established once
the authorities made the decision to allow rescues of troubled banks. Concomitantly, a procedure was
devised for soliciting information regarding the amount of loan defaults on the balance sheets of any
bank requesting assistance. In Japan the Financial Supervisory Agency, whose staﬀ of bank inspectors is
considerably larger than the former supervision team at the Ministry of Finance, was established late in
the crisis to administer the recapitalisation program. Banks requesting assistance are required to submit
detailed accounts to the Financial Reconstruction Commission which are subsequently made public. None
of this account information was previously available.
5O’Hara (1993) and Rajan (1994) model banks’ treatment of bad loans under the assumption of asym-
metric information between insiders and outsiders; however, the contexts are quite diﬀerent from this paper.
Dewatripont-Tirole (1994) also assume asymmetric information between regulators and banks; however,
they do not endogenize the bank’s choice or analyse the regulator’s bank closure decision.
6For example, Corbett (1998) provides a revealing quote from Lindgren et al.: “In addition, owners and
managers of unsound banks have incentives to show loans as performing in order not to lose their bank.”
In an IMF discussion of “risky” assumptions that analysts often make when working with economies where
there is no strong tradition of private ownership, Roulier (1997) notes, that “bank managers still function
under incentives that encourage rolling over rather than collecting bad debts.”
7Troubled by solvent banks may also roll over loans in Mitchell (1998b) and Rajan (1994).
4over their bad loans in the expectation of being rescued. Aghion, Bolton, and Fries (1998)
show that if insolvent banks are recapitalised and bank managers not dismissed, solvent
banks have an incentive to overstate their levels of bad debt (through excessive liquidation
of loans in default) in order to qualify for recapitalization.
Yet, no paper in the literature provides a potential explanation for the problem observed
in practice that too few, rather than too many, banks may come forward to accept the
government’s recapitalization oﬀer. Although some anecdotal evidence suggests that some
unsuccessful recapitalisation programs have failed because the conditions imposed on banks
were too stringent (for example, in Thailand), other anecdotal evidence suggests that this
is not the only source of reluctance to accept recapitalisations. Our proposed explanation
relates to banks’ reputational concerns.
Some empirical examples help to illustrate both the relevance of the question as to why
banks might refuse rescue oﬀers and the plausibility of our proposed explanation. First, in
order for banks to refuse a rescue oﬀer, they must have a choice about whether to accept
the oﬀer. This requires that recapitalisation is oﬀered to the banks rather than imposed. In
countries where banking sectors consist largely of state-owned banks, recapitalization may
be more likely to be imposed upon banks, provided that regulators are fully aware of the
banks’ problems. Yet, even here banks may have a choice as to how much recapitalization
they apply for, especially when recapitalization is linked to the restructuring of loans or to
transfers of loans to a hospital bank. (This was the case, for example, in the Hungarian bank
consolidation program.) In the cases of Mexico, Japan, Thailand, Malaysia, and Korea,
privately-owned banks were at the core of the recapitalisation program. In Mexico, Japan
and Thailand banks could voluntarily apply for programs while in Korea and Malaysia
some coercion seems to have been applied (see Athukorala (1999) and Smith (1999).
A second key observation is that in several cases where banks do have a choice, they
are reluctant to apply for recapitalisation. McQuerry (1999) notes that in Mexico fewer
banks than expected participated in the ﬁrst-round recapitalisation program oﬀered after
the 1994 currency crisis. She cites a report commissioned by the Mexican government
which attributed banks’ reluctance to participate to the fact that the market considered
participation by banks as a sign of weakness. In Japan several oﬀers of recapitalisation
since 1995 have met with very limited take-up. Of a Japanese package oﬀered in March,
51998 less than 8% was taken up. Moreover, anecdotal evidence suggests that government
pressure had to be applied to stronger banks to participate in order for weaker banks not
to suﬀer reputational damage. An even more substantial package oﬀered in early 1999
also had low take up and ultimately was accepted only when all the major banks applied
together, submitting all their requests on exactly the same day. This strongly suggests
that reputational eﬀects should not be ignored. Another telling example is provided by
Thailand, where only a tiny proportion of the available recapitalisation package has been
used and almost all major banks have rejected government funds.
Finally, numerous country studies of banking crises note the constantly moving target of
bad-loan reporting in all countries and document changing oﬃcial deﬁnitions, together with
variable disclosure standards, as the cause. The timing of recapitalisation oﬀers and the
subsequent revisions of estimates of bad loans in many cases (Japan is a well-documented
example) suggest that regulators have incomplete information when recapitalisation is of-
fered.8
Our model shows that reputational concerns can have implications for the circumstances
and conditions under which banks will accept recapitalisation oﬀers. This leads to some
implications about policy design. We ﬁnd that even when conditions accompanying a
recapitalisation program are very “soft,” banks may refuse to accept the plan. In order to
compensate bankers for the negative reputational eﬀects of accepting the plan, regulators
may have to oﬀer large amounts of recapitalisation that are unrelated to the degree of the
bank’s insolvency. Regulators who are constrained in the amount of recapitalisation that
they can oﬀer may be unable to undertake rescues.
Bank supervisory systems help to allay the consequences of bankers’ reputational con-
cerns. Speciﬁcally, if the probability of detecting banks who reject rescue oﬀers and attempt
to hide their bad debt is high enough, the regulator can induce troubled banks to accept
rescue plans (and reveal their nonperforming loans) with less recapitalisation than if the
probability of detection is low. Thus, a strong bank supervisory system aids the regula-
tor who opts for bank rescues. This result also suggests an explanation for international
diﬀerences in banks’ willingness to accept rescue oﬀers.
8McQuerry (1999) also notes that although the Mexican government reacted swiftly to the crisis by
proposing recapitalization and restructuring programs, “the absence of an established regulatory oversight
agency made it virtually impossible for the authorities to discern the breadth of the crisis.”
6We also derive results relating to the conditions accompanying rescue plans. Whereas
the regulator must avoid punishing bankers who accept rescue plans, the regulator will
want to impose costs on bankers who reject rescue plans but who later perform poorly.
By imposing tough conditions on banks that reject rescue plans rather than on banks
that accept plans, the regulator can induce banks to accept plans with smaller amounts
of recapitalisation. A ﬁnal result relating to rescue plans is that even when the regulator
takes account of bankers’ reputational concerns in designing a rescue plan, rejection of the
plan may occur in equilibrium.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 of the paper sets out the model, which bears
some similarity to the model of Rajan (1994). Section 3 analyses bank responses to rescue
oﬀers for the case of a single bank. Much of the intuition of the model comes through in this
section. Section 4 analyses bank responses in the model with two banks and investigates
how a bank’s willingness to accept a rescue plan is inﬂuenced by other banks’ performance.
Section 5 discusses the regulator’s optimal choice of rescue plan, given banks’ reputational
concerns. Section 6 concludes.
2 Model Description
Several of the basic elements of the model resemble features of the model of Rajan (1994).
We consider an economy with banks (of identical size), many potential borrowers and a
public market, which could be the labour market for bank managers or the stock or bond
market.9 The probability that banks experience loan defaults is a function of the state
of the world, which we take to be the severity of the banking crisis, and of the banker’s
type (ability). The possible states of the world are a “non-severe” crisis n or a severe crisis
s. Loan defaults may occur in either state of the world; however, the probability that a
bank has loan defaults is greater when the crisis is severe than when it is non-severe. A
9There is no explicit diﬀerence made between the utility function of bank managers and owners of
banks. The reputation term in the utility function can be taken to be the manager’s labour market
reputation or some element of utility (such as bonuses) tied to the banks’ reputation (i.e. stock market
value). Alternatively the utility function may be taken to refer to shareholder’s utility, in which case the
reputation term could be taken to be the stock market valuation itself. As will become evident below our
interpretation is more appropriately applied to managers than to owners.
7non-severe crisis may be thought of as a situation in which problems arise in the banking
sector, but the problems have not become widespread enough to be labeled a severe crisis.
Banks’ abilities, or types, are denoted by H (high) or L (low). A bank’s type determines
the state-dependent probability that it will suﬀer loan defaults. There are three possible
levels of default: no default; a medium level of default; and a high level of default. Our
assumptions on default levels as a function of the state of the world and the bank’s type
are illustrated in the following table.
Nonsevere Crisis Severe Crisis
High type No default Medium default
Low type Prob. θ: No default
Prob. (1 − θ): Medium default
Prob. θ: Medium default
Prob. (1 − θ): High default
These assumptions on default imply that more banks face loan defaults in a severe crisis
than in a nonsevere crisis, and low-type banks may be severely distressed in a severe crisis.
In the nonsevere crisis the only bank with default is the low type, which experiences a
medium level of default with probability (1 − θ). In the severe crisis the only bank with
a high level of default is a low type. For expositional simplicity our assumptions on loan
defaults are stylized. Our results are robust to changes in these assumptions. For example,
allowing for a diﬀerent probability ￿ θ that a low type has medium level of default in a severe
crisis or allowing for a probability ￿ θ that the high type has a high level of default in a
severe crisis would not alter signiﬁcantly the major results of the model; however, these
changes would signiﬁcantly complicate the algebra. We note in the discussion of our results
diﬀerences that would occur with diﬀering model speciﬁcations.
The bank observes both the state of the world, its type, and the loan defaults in its
portfolio.10 Information on the type and the level of loan defaults is private to the bank.
Information on the state of the world is also private to banks; outsiders, including the
regulator, do not initally observe the state of the world although they have a prior on this
variable.
Assume that all banks initially have outstanding loans with face value B and liabilities
of L. Our assumptions on default translate into balance sheet values in the following way.
10We assume, like Rajan, that each individual bank has a portfolio that is diversiﬁed enough to be able
to discern the severity of the crisis by observing the defaults in its own portfolio.
8If a bank has a loan in the amount of B in its portfolio and has no default, then it has a
current net worth (or current balance sheet value) of B − L. We will refer to this level of
current net worth as “high.” When the bank has a medium level of default, its current net
worth is ￿ B − L, where 0 < ￿ B<B . When the bank has a high level of default, its current
net worth is −L.
The banker with defaulting loans may choose either to reveal the default (for example,
by invoking bankruptcy procedures against the defaulters or writing oﬀ the loan) or to hide
the default (by rolling over or reﬁnancing the defaulting loan). If the bank “succeeds” in
hiding the default, it is able to report high current net worth (B − L), which is the same
level of net worth as it would have reported if the borrower had not been in default. On
the other hand, if the bank’s attempt to hide default “fails,” the bank must write oﬀ the
loan and report the current net worth stated above.11
Assumption 1: When a bank with default attempts to hide its defaulting loans, it
will “succeed” with probability a and “fail” with probability (1 − a).
We interpret the variable (1 − a) to be the probability that the bank’s attempt to
hide loan defaults is detected by prudential supervisors.12 This variable is a measure of
the “eﬀectiveness” of bank supervision. Since the value of a plays a critical role in the
equilibrium conditions in our model, this variable allows for comparison of the results across
economies with diﬀering qualities of supervisory institutions. It also introduces possible
explanations for observed international diﬀerences in banks’ acceptance of rescue plans.
We assume that when a bank with a medium level of default attempts rollover of
11We employ the term “current net worth” rather than current earnings because what is ultimately
important in banking crises is the bank’s balance sheet, rather than its income statement. As will be
seen below, bank recapitalisation oﬀered through a rescue plan improves the bank’s balance sheet and also
enters positively in the banker’s utility function.
12In addition to the motivation of hiding loan defaults, banks may roll over or reﬁnance bad loans in
an attempt to gamble for resurrection. Success in the latter would imply that by waiting, the bank has
succeeded in being repaid enough on its defaulting loans to avoid insolvency. In principle, the probability
of success in gambling for resurrection should be diﬀerent from the probability of bank supervisors de-
tecting the rolling over of loans. We abstract in this paper from the probability of success in gambling
for resurrection and focus on the latter probability. Nevertheless, in a manner consistent with models of
gambling for resurrection, we assume that rolling over defaulting loans results in a lower expected future
net worth for the bank.
9defaulting loans, it will succeed with positive probability a. In contrast, we assume that a
bank with a high level of default is already so insolvent that even if it attempts to hide its
bad loans it will become illiquid and its ﬁnancial distress will be discovered in the current
period; therefore, rollover will fail with certainty. The following assumption reﬂects these
ideas.
Assumption 2: a>0 for banks with a medium level of default; a =0for banks with
a high level of default.
Although a bank that rolls over or reﬁnances defaulting loans may succeed in hiding
the default in the current period, the attempt to hide default is assumed to lower expected
future recovery on the loans relative to the amount that would have been obtained if the
loans had been immediately revealed and dealt with. The lower expected future loan
recovery translates into lower bank net worth in the future period relative to the case
where loan defaults were immediately confronted. For example, postponing liquidation of
the defaulting borrower can result in a lower liquidation value since the borrower has more
time to dissipate the ﬁrm’s assets. Thus, even if the bank has rolled over the loan and
succeeded in reporting high net worth in the current period (i.e. it’s deception was not
detected), the bank bears a cost cb next period through lower expected future net worth,
where the subscript b indicates that the cost is a direct cost for the bank.
Yet, despite the reduction in the bank’s future net worth caused by loan rollovers, the
banker may still decide to hide loan defaults because of his current private reputational
concerns. The banker’s reputation is deﬁned to be proportional to the market’s belief about
the bank’s type. The market updates its prior regarding the bank’s type after observing
the bank’s current net worth. Thus, if the banker’s expected gain in reputational beneﬁts
from hiding default (and succeeding in reporting high current net worth) exceeds the future
costs generated by loan roll overs, then the banker will hide defaulting loans.
We now introduce into the model a bank regulator, who oﬀers (or not) to rescue and
recapitalise banks on the basis of her prior about the state of the world. We deﬁne a rescue
plan to be an oﬀer by the regulator to banks (that can show evidence of loan defaults)
of some level of recapitalisation, possibly with some other conditions imposed. Because
information on loan defaults and the state of the world is private to banks, the regulator
knows neither the state of the world nor the true state of banks’ balance sheets when she
10decides whether to oﬀer a rescue package. Banks’ responses to the rescue oﬀer, together
with the realization of their current net worths, will convey information about the state
of the world and about each bank’s ﬁnancial distress. The feature of banking crises that
we are intending to capture with this assumption is the observation discussed above that
regulators often make the decision to allow bank rescues once a banking crisis is perceived
to be severe enough; however, because of problems of asymmetric information the decision
to allow for bank rescues often occurs before regulators know the exact level of default on
individual banks’ balance sheets and even before they know which banks will ultimately
need to be recapitalised.13
A banker’s acceptance of a rescue oﬀer automatically reveals the bank’s defaulting
loans.14 In order for a bank to hide its loan defaults, it must reject the regulator’s rescue
oﬀer. Yet, in certain circumstances the regulator (as well as other outsiders) is able to
detect that a bank has attempted to hide its loan defaults. This occurs when the bank
rejects the regulator’s rescue oﬀer, rolls over defaulting loans, but rollover “fails.” The
regulator may in this case impose an additional cost cp on the bank, where the subscript p
indicates the possiblity that this cost is a private cost for the banker. For example, the cost
cp may represent a direct cost imposed by the regulator on “deceitful” banks (e.g. ﬁnes)
or it may represent the loss of private beneﬁts to bankers who lose control (e.g. through
nationalisations) or to bankers who lose their jobs or are more heavily monitored in the
future. The maximum level of the cost cp can be expected to vary across countries and is
related, in part, to powers given to regulators in dealing with troubled banks. For example,
13The assumption that the regulator does not know the severity of the crisis is not critical to our results,
although it does simplify the model by allowing us to abstract from any learning by the market of the
severity of the crisis from the amount of recapitalization oﬀered by the regulator to banks. What is
important is that the regulator does not know which banks are distressed. It is possible to show that even
when the regulator knows the state of the world (but not the ﬁnancial situation of any given bank) the
amount of recapitalization oﬀered in equilibrium will be the same across states of the world.
The extent to which in practice the regulator or the market has more information regarding banks’
ﬁnancial states has been an issue of debate in the literature. Empirical studies have yielded conﬂicting
answers to this question.
14It is possible (and even suggested by Japanese experience) that banks may choose to reveal only a
portion of their loan defaults when accepting an oﬀer of recapitalization. For simplicity, we consider in this
paper only the case where banks’ acceptance of a rescue oﬀer reveals the total amount of default.
11U.S. regulators have the power to bar bankers from the sector for life.15 This implies that
cp is very high for the U.S. In other countries where regulators have less power and/or
bankers have strong connections to the government, cp may be close to zero.16
Consider the situation in which a bank has defaulting loans and the regulator has made
a rescue oﬀer. If the banks wishes to reveal its loan defaults, it will accept the rescue oﬀer.
On the other hand, if the bank wishes to hide its defaults, it must reject the rescue oﬀer.
Thus, the bank’s possible actions may be described as {Re,A }, where Re denotes “reject”
and A denotes “accept” and where reject is synonymous with hiding default and accept is
synonymous with revealing.
What information does the market have? When it observes “reject ” and B, it does not
know whether the bank is a high type and the state is n; whether the bank is a low type,
the state is n, and rollover succeeded; or whether the bank is a high type, the state is s,
and the bank had no default or rollover succeeded. When the market observes “accept”
and ￿ B, then it knows that the bank has a medium level of default and has not rolled over
its loans. However, the market does not know whether the the bank is a low type in state n
or state s, or whether the bank is a high type in state s. When the market observes accept
and 0, it knows that the bank is a low type and that the state is s.
The timing of events is as follows.
Period 0
Banks make a loan
Period 1
State of the world realized and loan defaults occur
Regulator oﬀers rescue plan
Banks accept or reject the plan
If bank with default rejects plan, current net worth is high with probability a
Report of current net worth realized and observed by market
Market updates bank’s reputation
Period 2
Future loan repayments and costs (cb and cp) realized
15We thank Alton Gilbert for pointing this out to us.
16Some observers have expressed the opinion that Thailand may fall into the latter category.
12In period 0 the bank makes a loan. In period 1 banks observe the state of the world,
and each bank observes its level of defaulting loans. The regulator then makes a rescue
oﬀer (or not). Since the regulator does not observe the state of the world, his rescue oﬀer
conveys no information to the market about the state of the world. Banks then announce
whether they accept or reject the rescue plan. If a bank with default rejects the plan,
it will “succeed” with rollover with probabiliby a. After success or failure of rollover has
been realized, the bank’s reported current net worth is observed. The market then updates
the bank’s reputation. In period 2 the bank’s future net worth (reﬂecting the ultimate
repayment of defaulting loans) and costs associated with hiding default are realized.
Notation and additional assumptions:
(1) π is the market’s (and the regulator’s) initial prior regarding the probability that
the crisis is severe.
(2) p is the market’s initial prior regarding the probability that a bank is a high type.
(3) The market updates p via Bayesian updating (when possible). The posterior in the
case of high current net (B − L) worth is labelled p+; the posterior with medium current
net worth (￿ B − L) is pm; the posterior with low current net worth (−L) is p0.
(4) R is the amount of recapitalization oﬀered in a bank rescue plan.
(5) Ec = cb +( 1− a)cp represent the expected costs of rolling over loans.
2.1 The banker’s objective function:
Bank managers have an objective function which is a weighted sum of the bank’s expected
net worth and a term containing the bank’s reputation. The general form of the banker’s
expected utility is given by
U =( 1−γ) · (exp. net worth)+ γ · Ep (1)
where γ<1 is the weight placed on reputation, and Ep represents the banker’s expected
reputation. For simplicity, we assume no discounting. The term expected net worth is
deﬁned to be the expected future net worth of the bank, including any recapitalisation
oﬀered by the regulator through a rescue plan, and where future net worth reﬂects any
13costs associated with hiding default. Expected future bank net worth for each of the
diﬀering possible cases is:
Bank with no default: B − L
Bank with medium level of default which accepts rescue plan: ￿ B + R − L
Bank with medium level of default which rejects rescue plan: ￿ B − Ec− L
Bank with high level of default which accepts rescue plan: R − L
Bank with high level of default which rejects rescue plan: −L − cb − cp
Three features of these cases are worth noting. First, the bank with a medium level
of default has a future expected net worth of ￿ B if it accepts a plan (reveals its default),
and therefore takes an action such as using a bankruptcy proceeding against its defaulters.
This bank has a future expected net worth of something less than ￿ B if it rejects the plan
and attempts to hide its default. The fact that the cost cb is positive implies that hiding
default is ineﬃcient. Second, the bank with a medium level of default may be either solvent
or insolvent but still liquid. We assume that if a bank with a medium level of default is
insolvent, it is able to remain liquid for at least the current period. It is in fact a common
feature of banking that banks may actually become insolvent long before they are illiquid.17
Finally, because a bank with a high level of default which rejects a rescue plan is discovered
with certainty (Assumption 2), its expected cost of rollover is greater than that for the bank
with a medium level of default which rejects the plan. The expected cost of rollover for the
former bank is cb + cp, whereas for the latter this cost is Ec = cb +( 1− a)cp.
It is worth commenting on the implicit assumption that whereas the banker who suc-
cessfully rolls over bad loans enjoys a reputational beneﬁt in period 1, the banker suﬀers no
reputational cost in period 2 when its ultimate net worth turns out to be less than B−L.18
This assumption is made, as in Rajan, in order to capture the notion that bankers’ short-
term reputational concerns can aﬀect their behavior in response to defaulting loans, despite
the long-term costs of this behavior. It would be straightforward to modify the assump-
tions to explicitly guarantee that banks which succeed with rollover in period 1 cannot
17For example, many of the failed Savings and Loans in the U.S. Savings and Loans crisis were liquid up
until the date on which they were closed.
18Note that bankers still suﬀer the cost cb in period 2, which can be deﬁned to include costs of maintaining
deposits once depositors have discovered that the bank had defaulting loans. We discuss depositor behavior
in Section 6.
14be separated in period 2 from banks that had no defaulting loans on their balance sheets
in period 1. One such assumption could be that the market does not observe the bank’s
period-2 net worth until period 3. If bankers either heavily discount period 3 or leave the
bank at the end of period 2, no additional reputational costs will enter the banker’s utility
function.
Our analysis proceeds by backward induction. In Sections 3 and 4 we characterize the
eﬀects of diﬀering rescue plans on bank behavior. In this part of the analysis we take the
terms of rescue plans (i.e., the amount of recapitalisation oﬀered and the cost cp)t ob e
exogenous, and we identify necessary and suﬃcient conditions for rescue plans to succeed;
that is, to be accepted by banks with default on their balance sheets. In order to illustrate
the basic intuition, we present in the next section a model with only one bank.
3 The model with one bank
Our analysis focuses on pure-strategy equilibria. We derive the equilibrium conditions for
the bank’s choice of strategy in the face of the regulator’s oﬀer of recapitalisation and the
market’s updating of the bank’s reputation. The method consists of examining the bank’s
incentive compatibility constraints with diﬀering combinations of strategies and identifying
the range of parameter values for which the incentive compatibility conditions are satisﬁed.
We ﬁrst note a feature that is common to all equilibria.
Lemma 1 The bank with a high level of default will always accept a rescue plan.
Proof: See appendix.
The above lemma implies that in every equilibrium the low-type bank with a high level
of default in a severe crisis will accept a rescue plan. In addition, the high-type bank
will always reject the plan in the nonsevere crisis, since it has no loan defaults. Every
equilibrium will thus involve rejection of the plan by the high type in a nonsevere crisis
and acceptance of the plan by the low type with high default in a severe crisis. Equilibria
must therefore be distinguished by the action taken by the low-type bank with default in
the nonsevere crisis and by the bank with medium default in the severe crisis.
We deﬁne an equilibrium in the one-bank model by a set of strategies (σn,σ s), where
σ ∈{ A,Re} and σn refers to the strategy that the low-type bank chooses when it has
15default in the nonsevere crisis, and σs refers to the strategy that the bank with a medium
level of default chooses in the severe crisis. (It is straightforward to verify that low-type
banks with medium default in a severe crisis choose the same strategy in equilibrium as
high-type banks with medium default.)
One question that we address is whether the equilibrium strategies σn and σs can
diﬀer. We ﬁrst consider equilibria of the form (Re,Re) and (A,A). We link existence of
these equilibria to the strength of banking supervision, the costs of rollover, and the level
of recapitalisation oﬀered by the regulator. We then show that the equilibrium (Re,A)
does not exist and (A,Re) exists only for a limited range of parameter values. Finally, we
characterize the pure-strategy equilibria in the one-bank model.
3.1 Equilibrium (Re,Re)
Suppose that the nonsevere crisis occurs. (Recall that the severity of the crisis is unobserv-
able by the market.) The only bank that can have default in the nonsevere crisis is the low
type. The expected utility for the bank with default if it rejects the plan is




where p+(Re|(Re,Re),π) represents the bank’s updated reputation when it rejects the plan
and succeeds in reporting high current net worth, given that the market expects banks with
default in each state of the world to reject the plan. The term pm(Re|(Re,Re),π) represents
the bank’s reputation when it rejects the plan, rollover fails, and it must report a current
net worth consistent with a medium level of default. The values of the reputation terms
are given in the appendix.
The bank’s expected utility if it accepts the plan is
U(A|(Re,Re)) = (1 − γ)(R + ￿ B − L)+γp
m(A|(Re,Re),π).
The market cannot calculate pm(A|(Re,Re),π) by Bayes’ rule, since a bank’s acceptance of
a rescue plan is oﬀ the equilibrium path. We must specify the market’s out-of-equilibrium
belief in this case. We assume that the market assigns a value to pm(A|(Re,Re),π) by





pπ +( 1− p)[(1 − π)(1 − θ)+πθ]
which is equal to pm(Re|(Re,Re),π).








Now suppose that the crisis is severe. The expected utility of the bank with medium
default if it rejects the plan is given by




where p+(Re|(Re,Re),π) and pm(Re|(Re,Re),π) are deﬁned as above. This expected
utility is identical to that of the low-type bank with default in the nonsevere crisis. Similarly,
the bank’s expected utility if it accepts the plan is identical to the analogous utility for the
low type with default in the nonsevere crisis. Thus, the incentive compatibility constraints
of banks with medium default in each state of the world are identical.
Consider the IC constraint (2). This constraint implies that if the costs due to rollover
are low enough and if the amount of recapitalization oﬀered is low enough, the bank will
reject the plan. It is clear that a necessary condition for this constraint to be satisﬁed is that
the RHS is positive. The assumptions of the model guarantee that p+(Re|(Re,Re),π) ≥
pm(Re|(Re,Re),π), with strict inequality for all π<1; thus the RHS is strictly positive for






+(Re | (Re,Re),π) −p
m(Re | (Re,Re),π)].
A necessary condition for the equilibrium (Re,Re) to exist is that Ec+ R ≤ cre(a). It is
straightforward to verify that cre(a) is increasing in a. Thus, the higher is the probability of
success with rollover or, equivalently, the weaker is bank supervision, the larger the range
of values Ec+ R for which the equilibrium (Re,Re) will exist.
19We have shown in an earlier version of this paper that a more extreme assumption on out-of-equilibrium
beliefs, such as the assumption that pm(A|(Re,Re),π)=0 , further strengthens the results of this section.
173.2 Equilibrium (A,A)
As in the case of the (Re, Re) equilibrium, the incentive compatibility constraints are
identical for the bank with default in the nonsevere crisis and the bank with default in the
severe crisis. The expected utility for a bank with default if it accepts the plan is given by
U(A|A,A)) = (1 −γ)(R + ￿ B −L)+γp
m(A|A,A),π)
where the value of pm(A | (A,A),π) is given in the appendix. If the bank rejects the plan,
its expected utility is
U(Re|(A,A) )=( 1− γ)(￿ B − L − Ec)+γ[ap
+(Re|(A,A),0 )+( 1− a)p
m(Re|(A,A),π)].
When the bank rejects the plan and reports high current net worth, the market believes
that the state is n and sets π =0in updating the bank’s reputation. On the other hand,
pm(Re|(A,A),π) cannot be computed via Bayes’ rule, since rejecting the plan and having
current net worth consistent with a medium level of default is oﬀ the equilibrium path.
We assume, in a manner analogous to Section 3.1, that the market assigns a value to
pm(Re|(A,A),π) by computing the probability that the bank is a high type given that it
rejects the plan and has a medium level of default. The values of the reputation terms are
given in the appendix. It is easily veriﬁed that pm(Re|(A,A),π)=pm(A | (A, A),π).





+(Re | (A,A),0) − p
m(A | (A, A),π)].
This constraint states that banks with default will accept the plan if the sum of the expected
costs of rollover and recapitalisation are high enough. Deﬁne the following critical value,






+(Re | (A,A),0) − p
m(A | (A, A),π)]
A necessary condition for the equilibrium (A,A) to exist is that Ec+ R ≥ cA(a). It is
easily veriﬁed that cA(a) is increasing in a.
183.3 Characterization of equilibria in the one-bank model.
We characterize here the pure strategy equilibria in the one-bank model. The following
proposition describes equilibria with state-independent strategies for banks with medium
default.
Proposition 1 (i) For every a, there exist values cRe(a) and cA(a),w i t hcA(a) >c Re(a),
such that an equilibrium (A,A) exists if Ec + R ≥ cA(a) and an equilibrium (Re,Re) exists
if Ec+ R ≤ cRe(a); (ii) as a increases, the equilibrium (A,A) becomes less likely and the
equilibrium (Re,Re) becomes more likely.
Proof: See appendix.
Part (i) of the above proposition summarizes the discussion of the previous sections,
which pertain to pure-strategy equilibria. For values of Ec+R ∈ (cRe(a),c A(a)) equilibria
are in mixed strategies. Part (ii) of the proposition illustrates the link between the strength
of banking supervision and the willingness of banks to accept rescue plans. The weaker is
banking supervision (i.e., the higher is a), the greater the region of the parameter space for
which banks will reject rescue plans and the smaller the region for which banks will accept
rescue plans. This being said, the level of recapitalisation oﬀered by the regulator can also
play an inﬂuential role in inducing acceptance of a rescue plan. More precisely, we may
state the following corollaries.
Corollary 1 Let RA(a)=cA(a) − Ec. The equilibrium (A,A) exists for all R ≥ RA(a).
Corollary 2 RA(a) is increasing in a.
These corollaries indicate that for every value of a there is a minimum level of recapi-
talisation RA(a) such that the regulator can always induce banks to accept the rescue plan
by oﬀering a level of recapitalisation that is at least as large as RA(a). Thus, a regulator
who is unconstrained in the amount of recapitalisation oﬀered to banks can always induce
banks to accept a rescue plan and reveal their default. Corollary 2 states that the minimum
recapitalisation RA(a) necessary to induce acceptance of rescue plans is increasing in a. The
weaker the level of banking supervision, the greater the amount of recapitalisation that is
necessary to induce banks to accept a rescue plan.
19The above corollaries illustrate how recapitalisation can compensate banks for the nega-
tive reputational eﬀect of revealing default and induce them to accept a plan. Interestingly,
the expression for RA(a) implies that the amount of recapitalisation required to generate
an equilibrium (A,A) is unrelated to the amount necessary to bring an insolvent bank to
solvency. This is due to the assumption that banks with medium default can remain liquid
in period 1 even though they may be insolvent, which allows banks to reject a rescue plan
without fear of bank closure if they succeed in hiding their default. Bankers’ reputational
concerns may force the regulator to oﬀer an amount of recapitalisation that is well above
the amount necessary to restore solvency to the bank.
We now address the possibility of existence of equilibria where the strategies chosen by
banks with medium default diﬀer across the states of the world.
Proposition 2 (i) Equilibria of the form (Re,A) do not exist; (ii) Equilibria of the form
(A,Re) exist for a restricted range of parameter values.
Proof: See appendix.
The above proposition states that it is impossible to have an equilibrium where banks
with default reject the plan in the nonsevere crisis and accept the plan in a severe crisis.
In contrast, it is possible for a limited range of pairs (Ec,R) to have an equilibrium where
banks accept the plan in a nonsevere crisis and reject in the severe crisis. This equilibrium
exists only for a range of values of Ec. Moreover, for each value of Ec in this range, there
is only one value of R for which the equilibrium can exist. Finally, the necessary and





greater than cA(a). In order for this equilibrium to exist, the sum Ec + R must exceed
the value necessary for existence of the (A,A) equilibrium. Thus, for parameter values for
which the equilibrium (A,Re) exists, the equilibrium (A,A) also exists.
It is worth pointing out that equilibria derived in this and the next section are actually
continuation equilibria; that is, they are equilibria given some choice of cp and R by the
regulator. We show in the proposition below that the amount of recapitalization required
for existence of the equilibrium (A,Re) exceeds the minimum amount of recapitalization
necessary to induce an equilibrium (A,A). This result is shown in Section 5 to imply
that the continuation equilibrium (A,Re) cannot be an equilibrium when we allow for the
regulator’s choice of R and cp.









￿ R(a) >R A(a).
Proof: Straightforward.
The above proposition implies that the regulator can induce banks with medium default
to accept the plan with a lower level of recapitalization than that required for existence of an
equilibrium (A,Re). Since we show in Section 5 that the regulator always prefers the lower
level of recapitalization, we ignore the equilibrium (A,Re) in the remaining discussion.
The results of this section suggest some possible explanations for international dif-
ferences in bank behavior in banking crises. Given our interpretation of (1 − a) as the
probability that prudential monitoring will detect the existence of rollover of defaulting
loans in banks’ portfolios (thus rollover will “fail”), our results suggest that in banking sys-
tems where prudential regulation is strong (i.e., a is low), regulators can induce troubled
banks to reveal their default by oﬀering a rescue package with less government ﬁnancial
support than would be necessary if prudential regulation were weak. In contrast, in bank-
ing systems with less well developed prudential regulation, regulators are disadvantaged by
banks’ reputational concerns. Regulators may be required to oﬀer large amounts of recapi-
talisation in order to induce banks to accept rescue oﬀers and to reveal the default on their
balance sheets. This suggests the possibility that a vicious circle can arise: weak banking
supervision increases the probability of occurrence of a banking crisis; once a banking crisis
develops, banks may be unwilling to reveal their bad loans unless oﬀered a large amount of
recapitalisation. Yet, regulators in countries with insuﬃciently strong supervisory institu-
tions who also face constraints on the amount of recapitalisation that can be paid to banks
may be unable to induce troubled banks to accept rescue plans.
Another parameter that can be linked to international diﬀerences in ﬁnancial systems
and regulation, and therefore, to diﬀerences in banks’ reactions to rescue oﬀers, is cp, the
cost that the regulator may impose on the banker who rejects the plan then reports low
current net worth. If cp is high enough, the incentive compatibility constraint for the
equilibrium (A,A) can be satisﬁed, and the regulator can induce the bank to accept a
plan with only negligible recapitalisation. Strikingly, this result implies not only that the
regulator must refrain from imposing punishment on bankers who accept rescue plans (as
pointed out by Aghion, Bolton, and Fries (1998)) but also that the regulator may want
21to impose punishment on bankers who reject rescue plans then exhibit poor performance.
We show in Section 5 that any rescue plan chosen by the regulator will always impose
the maximum level of cp. As far as we are aware, the potential importance of applying
punishment to banks who do not accept rescue oﬀers and then perform poorly has not
been recognized in analyses of policy responses to banking crises.
Our results relating to equilibria in the one-bank model resemble those that can be ob-
tained in the absence of a rescue plan (see Rajan). Nevertheless, two diﬀerences stand out.
First, the bank’s response to the regulator’s rescue oﬀer conveys information to outsiders
concerning the bank’s strategy with respect to its bad loans. This information, in addition
to the bank’s current net worth, can be used by the market to update its prior on the
severity of the crisis, which is then used in updating the bank’s reputation. In the absence
of a rescue oﬀer outsiders observe only the bank’s current net worth; therefore, they obtain
no direct information regarding the bank’s strategy. Second, the regulator who oﬀers a res-
cue plan can impose the cost cp on a banker that rejects the plan then reports low current
net worth. This cost, which does not exist in the model in which the regulator is absent,
increases the probability of the bank’s revealing its defaulting loans. These features lead
to the result that the mere oﬀer of a rescue plan, even one with very little recapitalisation,
motivates banks to reveal their default more often (i.e., for a larger range of parameter
values) than when no rescue plan is oﬀered.
4T w o - b a n k m o d e l
We consider in this section a model with two banks, which permits us to study the inter-
action of banks’ strategies. In this model banks’ strategies become interdependent due to
the fact that the market takes into account Bank 2’s accept/reject decision and current
performance when updating its belief about Bank 1’s type, given the latter’s accept/reject
decision and current performance. Implicitly, the market uses Bank 2’s performance to
update its prior on the state of the world and then applies the updated prior on the state
when it updates Bank 1’s reputation. The market similarly takes into account Bank 1’s
performance when updating its belief about Bank 2’s type. Thus, when a bank is deciding
whether to accept or reject a plan, it must take into account the other bank’s expected
22behavior and performance given the state of the world and the eﬀects of this performance
on the market’s updating of the original bank’s reputation.
As in the previous section, one of the questions of interest is whether the equilibrium
strategy chosen by a bank with default in a nonsevere crisis can diﬀer from the strategy
chosen by a bank with default in a severe crisis. It is indeed reasonable to suspect that
in the two-bank model the strategies chosen by banks in each state may diﬀer. A natural
conjecture, that is also suggested by the two-bank model of Rajan, is that banks with default
might be more willing to reveal their bad loans in a severe crisis than in a nonsevere crisis.
Since other banks are more likely to have default in a severe crisis, the market will revise
upward its prior on the severe crisis; therefore, the reputational eﬀects of revealing loan
defaults will be less unfavorable. We do ﬁnd that an equilibrium exists whereby banks with
default accept the plan in a severe crisis whereas banks with default reject the plan when
the crisis is nonsevere.
The timing of the two-bank model is as follows.
Timing
Period 0
Banks make a loan
Period 1
State of the world realized and loan defaults occur
Regulator oﬀers rescue plan
Banks simultaneously announce acceptance or rejection of the plan
If a bank with default rejects the plan, its current net worth is high with probability a
Current net worth realized by both banks and observed by market
Market updates both banks’ reputations
Period 2
Future loan repayments and costs (cb and cp) realized
As before, we focus on equilibria in pure strategies. We consider equilibria that are
symmetric in Bank 1 and Bank 2’s strategies; i.e., equilibria in which Bank 1 will adopt the
same strategy if it is a high type as will Bank 2 if it is a high type. In order to simplify the
algebra, we make two minor changes of assumption. First, we set γ =1 /2, so that terms
involving γ drop out of the incentive compatibility conditions. Second, we assume that in
23a severe crisis low-type banks have a high level of default with certainty. Our assumptions
on default are illustrated in the following table.
Nonsevere Crisis Severe Crisis
High type No default Medium default
Low type Prob. θ: No default
Prob. (1 − θ): Medium default
High default
Each of these changes is made for expositional purposes only. The change in our assump-
tions on default greatly simpliﬁes the expressions for the reputation terms and the proofs
of our results. All of our results nevertheless hold for the default assumptions analyzed in
Section 3.20
As in the previous section all equilibria in the two-bank model have the characteristic
that banks with high default accept the plan and banks with no default reject the plan. Our
deﬁnition of an equilibrium is therefore analogous: an equilibrium is a pair of strategies (σn,
σs) chosen by banks with medium default in the nonsevere and severe crises, respectively,
with σ ∈{ Re,A}. In contrast to the one-bank model, however, the incentive compatibility
conditions associated with a given strategy are not identical across states of the world. This
is due to the fact that Bank 2’s expected performance enters into the reputation terms for
Bank 1, and Bank 2’s expected performance is a function of the state of the world. Thus,
Bank 1’s optimal strategy is indirectly a function of the state of the world, and two incentive
compatibility conditions must be satisﬁed for each equilibrium to exist.
For purposes of illustration we consider the equilibrium (Re,Re). In this equilibrium
banks with default in the nonsevere crisis reject the plan, as do banks with default in the
severe crisis. Suppose that the crisis is nonsevere. The only bank with default in this state
of the world is the low type. If this bank rejects the plan, its expected utility is
U
L
n(Re) = ￿ B − L − Ec+
[p +( 1− p)θ]{ap
1+(Re|(Re,Re),π
2+(Re)) + (1 − a)p
1m(Re|(Re,Re),π
2+(Re))}
+(1 − p)(1 − θ){a[ap
1+(Re|(Re,Re),π





2+(Re)) + (1 − a)p
1m(Re|(Re,Re),π
2m(Re))]}
20Proofs of our results for the assumptions used in Section 3 are available upon request.
24where p1+(Re|(Re,Re),π 2+(Re)) represents Bank 1’s updated reputation when it rejects
the plan and reports high current net worth, given that the market expects banks’ strate-
gies to be (Re,Re) and given that Bank 2 also rejects the plan and has high current net
worth. The term p1m(Re|(Re,Re),π 2+(Re)) represents Bank 1’s updated reputation when
it rejects the plan and rollover fails, given that Bank 2 has rejected the plan and reported
high current net worth. Bank 1 does not know Bank 2’s type. With probability [p+(1−p)θ]
Bank 2 will have no default and will reject the plan and report high current net worth.
With probability (1 − p)(1 − θ) Bank 2 will have default, in which case it will reject the
plan and report high current net worth with probability a and medium current net worth
with probability (1 − a). Expressions for the reputation terms appear in the appendix.




n(A)=(￿ B − L + R)+[ p+( 1−p)θ][p
1m(A|(Re,Re),π
2+(Re))]
+(1 − p)(1 −θ){ap
1m(A|(Re,Re),π
2+(Re)) + (1 − a)p
1m(A|(Re,Re),π
2m(Re))}
where p1m(A|(Re,Re),π2+(Re)) represents Bank 1’s updated reputation given that it ac-
cepts the plan and given that Bank 2 rejects the plan and reports high current net worth.
Note that each of the reputation terms in the above expression is oﬀ the equilibrium path;
therefore, we have to make assumptions about out-of-equilibrium beliefs. We make an as-
sumption similar to that of Section 3. For the term p1m(A|(Re,Re),π 2+(Re)) we assume
that the market computes the probability that Bank 1 is a high type, given that it ac-
cepts the plan and given that Bank 2 rejects the plan and reports high current net worth.
It is easily veriﬁed that p1m(A|(Re,Re),π 2+(Re)) = p1m(Re|(Re,Re),π 2+(Re)). Similarly,
p1m(Re|(Re,Re),π2m(Re)) = p1m(A|(Re,Re),π 2m(Re)).
Using these observations, we may write the low type bank’s IC constraint in the non-
severe crisis as
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1m(Re | (Re,Re),π
2m(Re))]}
+(1 − p)(1 − acp)
With probability p Bank 2 will have a medium level of default and will reject the plan. In
this case with probability a Bank 2 will succeed in reporting high current net worth. With
probability (1 − p) Bank 2 will be a low type and has a high level of default. In this case
Bank 2 will accept the plan, in which case the market knows that the crisis is severe and
that Bank 1 is a high type. The regulator, however, now knows that Bank 1 rolled over
its defaulting loans. Therefore, even in the case where Bank 1 succeeded with rollover and
was able to report a high current net worth, the regulator can impose the cost cp on the
bank. This explains the appearance of the term −(1−p)acp in addition to the inclusion of
(1 − a)cp in the deﬁnition of Ec.
When the bank accepts the plan, its expected utility is
U
H
s (A)=R + ￿ B −L
+p{ap
1m(A|(Re,Re),π
2+(Re)) + (1 − a)p
1m(A|(Re,A),π
2m(Re))} +( 1− p) · 1
The incentive compatibility constraint for the high type in the severe crisis can be
expressed, after some rearrangement, as










−(1 − p)acp. (4)
A necessary condition for the equilibrium (Re,Re) to exist is that the right-hand side of
each incentive compatibility constraint is positive. It turns out that with our assumptions
on default in this section, there exist parameter values for which this necessary condition is
not satisﬁed; i.e., for which the RHS of at least one of the IC constraints is negative. This
results from the fact that for certain combinations of parameter values (namely, π and θ)
26a bank’s reputation is actually lower when it rejects the plan and reports high current net
worth than when it accepts the plan or than when it rejects the plan and reports medium
current net worth. In this case the RHS of the constraint becomes negative.
That the bank’s reputation may be higher when it reveals default than when it rejects
the plan and reports high current net worth may appear counterintuitive; however, the
explanation is logical. In the severe crisis all banks have default, but only the high type
has a medium level of default. Therefore, if the market’s prior π on the severe crisis is
high enough (and if the value of θ is “large enough” so that low types have medium default
with only low probability in the nonsevere crisis), then revelation of a medium level of
default signals good news about the bank’s type. In this situation, high type banks have
an incentive to accept the plan in the severe crisis. However, the low-type bank with default
in the nonsevere crisis may now also have an incentive to accept the plan.
Note that with the assumptions on default used in the model of Section 3, this situ-
ation does not arise; the RHS of the each of the above IC constraints is always positive.
The explanation follows from the fact that as θ increases, the low-type bank has a larger
probability of having a medium level of default in the severe crisis, which oﬀsets the corre-
sponding decrease in the probability of the low type having medium default in a nonsevere
crisis. A medium level of default no longer signals good news about the bank’s type.
A higher reputation associated with revelation versus nonrevelation of default by high-
type banks in severe crises is consistent with the practice sometimes observed whereby the
healthier banks are the ﬁrst to reveal and write oﬀ bad loans during a crisis, and they
improve their reputations by doing so.21 In our model, a lowering of the probability that
the low type has a medium level of default in the severe crisis relative to its probability of
having no default in the nonsevere crisis has the eﬀect of improving the high type’s ability
to signal its type by revealing its default when it has loan defaults. As a consequence, the
region of the parameter space for which banks will accept the plan increases.
21See Gibson (1999) for a model in which the same result occurs. Good banks can use loan-loss disclosures
to signal information about their quality to markets. Gibson also supplies empirical evidence of this
phenomenon for the U.S. and Japan.
274.1 Characterization of equilibria in the two-bank model.
We ﬁrst describe pure-strategy equilibria (Re,Re) and (A,A). Discussion of these equilibria
applies to parameter values for which the equilibrim (Re,Re) may exist; i.e., for which the
RHS of the both incentive compatibility constraints in the (Re,Re) equilibrium are positive.
Proposition 4 There exist critical values cRR(a) and cAA(a), with cAA(a) >c RR(a), such
that an equilibrium (Re,Re) exists if cRR(a) > 0 and Ec+R ≤ cRR(a); and an equilibrium
(A,A) exists if Ec+ R ≥ cAA(a).
Proof: See appendix.
The description of equilibria (Re,Re) and (A,A) is similar to that for the one-bank
model, with the principal diﬀerence being that in the two-bank model the critical value
cRR(a) is the minimum of the critical values implied by each of the incentive compatibility
conditions for the equilibrium (Re,Re); and the critical value cAA(a) is the maximum of the
critical values implied by each of the incentive compatibility conditions for the equilibrium
(A,A).
We now turn to the possibility of equilibria where the strategies diﬀer in each state of
the world. The following proposition demonstrates that the only pure-strategy equilibrium
in which banks with default in the nonsevere crisis will adopt a diﬀerent strategy from
banks in the severe crisis is the equilibrium (Re,A). In this equilibrium banks with default
reject the plan when the crisis is nonsevere; however, they accept the plan when the crisis
is severe. This implies that regulators will not be able to successfully rescue banks unless
the crisis is severe.
Proposition 5 (i) There exists a critical value cRA(a) such that an equilibrium (Re,A)
exists if cRA(a) > 0 and Ec+ R ≤ cRA(a); (ii) the equilibrium (A,Re) does not exist.
Proof: See appendix.
The intuition associated with the equilibrium (Re,A) is that given the market’s beliefs,
a high-type bank in the severe crisis can signal its type by accepting the plan, since it
knows that Bank 2 will accept the plan and the market will believe that the crisis is severe.
On the other hand, if Bank 1 rejects the plan when Bank 2 accepts, the market is not
sure of the state of the world, and Bank 1 loses its ability to signal its type. The incentive
28compatibility constraint for acceptance of the plan by the high type in the severe crisis
is thus always satisﬁed. In contrast, the bank with default in the nonsevere crisis cannot
perfectly fool the market by accepting the plan, since Bank 2 will always reject the plan in
the nonsevere crisis. Hence, if Ec+R is low enough, the bank with default in the nonsevere
crisis has the incentive to reject the plan.
What can we say about the occurrence of the equilibrium (Re,Re) versus the equilibrium
(Re,A)? In the equilibrium (Re,Re) the incentive constraint for the high type is more
binding than the IC constraint for the low type. A necessary and suﬃcient condition for
existence of this equilibrium is that Ec + R ≤ RHS (4). In addition, the IC constraint
for the high type in the equilibrium (Re,Re) requires a lower value of Ec+R than the IC
constraint for the low type in the equilibrium (Re,A). Thus, cRR <c RA. The equilibrium
(Re,A) exists for a larger range of parameter values than does the equilibrium (Re,Re).
For all values of Ec+ R for which the equilibrium (Re,Re) exists, the equilibrium (Re,A)
also exists.
Proposition 5 shows that it impossible in equilibrium for banks with default in the
severe crisis to reject a plan if banks in the nonsevere crisis accept the plan. This result
arises again from the fact that it is always easier to induce a bank with medium default
in the severe crisis to accept a plan than a bank with medium default in the nonsevere
crisis. Hence, if the sum Ec+ R is high enough to induce banks to accept the plan in the
nonsevere crisis, then this sum will be too large to be compatible with rejection of the plan
by the high-type bank in the severe crisis.
In summary, the interaction of banks’ strategies in this model motivates banks to accept
plans more readily in a severe crisis than in a nonsevere crisis. This leads to the possibility
of equilibria where, although banks with default reject the plan in the nonsevere crisis,
banks with default in the severe crisis will accept the plan. Regulators who wish to oﬀer
bank rescues may not be successful in doing so until the banking crisis is severe.
5 The optimal rescue plan
The analysis of the previous sections has taken the conditions of rescue plans—that is, the
values of R and cp—as given. On the basis of this analysis we may make some tentative
29observations regarding the conditions of rescue plans that would be chosen by the regulator
when she takes into account the eﬀects of reputation on banks’ willingness to accept rescue
plans. In this section we discuss aspects of the regulator’s choice of rescue plan, without
undertaking a comprehensive analysis of this choice.
We take as given that regulators who have decided to oﬀer banks rescue plans perceive
some expected beneﬁt V from the rescue of a troubled bank. One might expect that the
value of V increases with the regulator’s belief π that the banking crisis is severe and as the
negative externalities associated with multiple bank failures increase. Consider a regulatory
objective function with the following simple form:
max{[VI A − g(R)],0}
where V is the expected beneﬁt associated with the rescue of a troubled bank; IA is an
indicator function which takes on a value of 1 if the bank accepts the rescue oﬀer and 0
otherwise; g(R) is the cost function associated with recapitalization. We assume that g(·)
is nondecreasing in the amount of recapitalisation R oﬀered to the bank. Note that the
indicator function I is a function of all of the parameters identiﬁed in Sections 3 and 4
that inﬂuence banks’ willingness to accept rescue plans: the state of the world, the amount
of recapitalization oﬀered in the plan, the expected costs of rollover cb and cp, and the
reputation formed in the market.
The regulator’s problem is to choose cp and R, subject to constraints on the maximum
feasible values of these variables, to maximize the above objective function. The maximum
feasible value of cp, which we will denote by cp, is determined by the ﬁnancial system and
existing regulatory institutions. The regulator may also face a constraint R on R, if the
amount of recapitalization that can be oﬀered is subject to a budgetary limit.
For simplicity we consider the regulator’s choice in the context of the one-bank model.
We then note how the results would diﬀer in the two-bank model. A ﬁrst result follows
immediately.
Proposition 6 The regulator will choose cp = cp in any rescue plan.
The analysis of Sections 3 and 4 has identiﬁed the unambiguously positive eﬀect of the
cost cp on banks’ willingness to accept rescue plans. Moreover, imposing the cost cp in a
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maximum level. This result leads to some additional observations. If cp is suﬃciently high
to induce the bank to accept the plan with certainty (i.e., to induce the (A,A) equilibrium),
then the regulator will oﬀer a rescue plan with only negligible recapitalization. If, on the
other hand, cp is suﬃciently low that the bank will reject a plan with no recapitalization,
then the regulator must consider oﬀering a positive level of R.
Now consider the level of recapitalization RA(a)=cA(a) − Ec, deﬁned in Section 3.2
as the minimum level of recapitalization required to induce the bank to accept a rescue
plan with certainty. Denote by RA(a,cp) this minimum level of recapitalization when
cp = cp. We take RA(a,cp) to be equal to 0 if cp is suﬃciently high to induce the bank
to accept a plan with no recapitalization. We now deﬁne another level of recapitalization:
Rre(a,cp)=cre(a) − Ec, where cre(a) is deﬁned in Section 3.1 and where we use cp in the
deﬁnition of Ec. Rre(a,cp) represents the maximum amount of recapitalization such that
the equilibrium (Re,Re) exists. That is, if Rre(a,cp) > 0, then any rescue plan with R<
Rre(a,cp) will be rejected with certainty. We may now state a second, immediate result.
Proposition 7 Let R∗ be the optimal amount of recapitalization oﬀered in a rescue plan.
Then, Rre(a,cp) ≤ R∗ ≤ RA(a,cp), with R∗ = RA(a,cp) when the regulator wishes for the
bank to accept the plan with certainty.
This proposition states that the regulator never oﬀers a rescue plan with an amount
of recapitalization less than max[Rre(a,cp),0], since this rescue plan would be rejected
with certainty. This also implies that if the regulator faces a constraint on the amount
of recapitalization that she can oﬀer and if R<R re(a,cp), then no rescue plan will be
oﬀered. The proposition also implies that the regulator never oﬀers a rescue plan with a
level of capitalization that exceeds RA(a,cp), since a plan with RA(a,cp) will be accepted
with certainty. If the regulator chooses to oﬀer a rescue plan that induces the equilibrium
(A,A), then she will oﬀer exactly RA(a,cp). Recall that this level of recapitalization may
be zero if cp is suﬃciently high.
There may nevertheless exist circumstances in which the regulator chooses a level of
recapitalization that is strictly less than RA(a,cp). Recall from Section 3.3 that for values
of Ec+ R such that cRe(a) <E c+ R<c A(a), no pure strategy equilibria exist; equilibria
are in mixed strategies. For each value of Ec + R in this range, there is some positive
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would exist). Consider a value ￿ R such that cRe(a) <E c+ ￿ R<c A(a). Assume that the
probability that the bank accepts the plan in the mixed-strategy equilibrium induced by ￿ R
is equal to λ. The regulator’s expected utility from oﬀering a rescue plan with cp and ￿ R is
given by
λ[V − g(￿ R)].
With probability λ the bank accepts the plan and the regulator’s utility will equal V −g(￿ R);
with probability (1 − λ) the bank will reject the plan and the regulator’s utility will equal
zero. In order to decide whether to oﬀer the rescue plan with ￿ R rather than RA(a,cp), the
regulator must compare λ[V −g(￿ R)] with V −g(RA(a,cp)). If the costs of oﬀering RA(a,cp)
in recapitalization are high enough or if the probability λ is high enough, the regulator’s
utility will be higher with the rescue plan with ￿ R. In this case the regulator will choose to
oﬀer the lower amount of recapitalization ￿ R, knowing that with some probability the bank
will reject the plan. The optimal level of recapitalization will be the value R∗ in the range
Rre(cp) ≤ R∗ ≤ RA(a,cp) which maximizes the regulator’s expected utility.
Now consider the model with two banks. The results of the above discussion also apply
to this model, with the additional result that there exist levels of recapitalization that
generate the pure-strategy equilibrium (Re,A) in which banks will reject the plan if the
crisis is nonsevere and accept the plan if the crisis is severe. Similarly to the case of mixed-
strategy equilibria discussed above, it can be shown that the optimal level of recapitalization
oﬀered in the rescue plan may be one that generates the equilibrium (Re,A). In this case,
only if the crisis is severe will banks be willing to accept the plan.
In summary, when the regulator takes into account banks’ reputational concerns, the
optimal rescue plan will involve imposition of the maximum feasible value of cp on banks
that reject rescue plans then report loan defaults. In addition, the level of recapitalization
oﬀered in the optimal rescue plan may be low enough so that with positive probability the
plan will be rejected. Banks’ reputational concerns can result in the equilibrium rejection
of optimal rescue plans.
326C o n c l u s i o n
This paper models bank behavior during banking crises when asymmetric information exists
between banks and outsiders regarding the extent of bad loans on banks’ balance sheets.
We show that asymmetric information creates the incentive for banks to roll over their
nonperforming loans in an attempt to disguise their ﬁnancial states. Although a regulator
may be able to combat this incentive by oﬀering a “soft” rescue package, reputational
concerns by bankers may cause them to reject rescue oﬀers and to continue with loan
rollovers. In order to induce banks to accept rescue plans and to address their problem
loans, regulators may be forced to oﬀer amounts of recapitalization that well exceed the
amount necessary to restore banks to solvency. This “extra” recapitalization serves to
compensate bankers for the reputational harm caused by the revelation of bad loans that
accompanies acceptance of a rescue oﬀer. If regulators are constrained in the amount of
recapitalization that they can oﬀer, they may be unable to induce banks to accept rescue
plans and to reveal their bad loans, or they may have to wait until the banking crisis is
severe (and more banks become distressed) before banks are willing to accept rescues.
In addition to oﬀering a potential explanation for several observed cases in which banks
have refused oﬀers of rescue in banking crises, our model yields some insight into the link
between bank supervisory institutions that are in place ex ante and the policy options
that are available to regulators ex post, once a crisis has occurred. In countries with strong
supervisory systems, regulators can induce banks to accept rescue plans with lower amounts
of recapitalization than if the supervisory system were weak. This suggests the possibility
of a vicious circle arising in countries with weak supervisory institutions, whereby weak
banking supervision increases the probability of occurrence of a banking crisis, but once a
banking crisis develops banks are unwilling to reveal their bad loans unless oﬀered a large
amount of recapitalisation.
A novel policy implication of our analysis is that the optimal rescue plan imposes a cost
on banks that reject rescue oﬀers and then exhibit poor performance. By committing to
imposing a punishment on banks which reject rescue oﬀers and then are discovered to be in
poor ﬁnancial shape, the regulator can induce troubled banks to accept a rescue oﬀer with
less recapitalization than in the absence of such a commitment. If this cost is high enough,
the regulator can induce banks to accept rescue plans with only negligible recapitalization.
33This result points to an informational role that is served by bank rescue oﬀers in our
model. An oﬀer of rescue forces a bank to take an explicit stand with respect to the
presence of bad loans on its balance sheets. The bank’s acceptance or rejection of a rescue
oﬀer conveys information to bank outsiders—which they would not otherwise receive—about
the severity of the banking crisis, the bank’s type, and its treatment of nonperforming loans.
This creates the possibility of punishing banks who attempt to hide their nonperforming
loans and are discovered. The ultimate eﬀect of the increase in information generated by
the oﬀer of a rescue plan is to induce banks to reveal their defaulting loans more often than
in the absence of rescue oﬀers.
Yet, banks may still decide to reject rescue oﬀers. Even when the regulator takes into
account bankers’ reputational concerns in designing a rescue oﬀer, rejection of the rescue
oﬀer may occur in equilibrium. For example, it is possible that high costs of recapitalization
may result in an optimal plan in which the regulator oﬀers an amount of recapitalization
which will be accepted by banks only if the crisis is severe enough. If the crisis is less severe,
banks will reject the oﬀer.
To this point our discussion and analysis have ignored depositor behavior. We can now
address this issue. Like the market, depositors do not observe the state of the world or
the bank’s type. When a bank rejects a rescue plan in period 1 and succeeds, depositors
are unaware of the bank’s true ﬁnancial state. However, one might reasonably assume that
depositors do observe the true ﬁnancial state of the bank in period 2. Therefore, even if
a bank with loan defaults has succeeded in hiding the defaults in period 1, depositors will
observe the bank’s true net worth in period 2 and can decide to exit the bank. This would
impose an additional cost on the bank which rolled over its defaulting loans in period 1,
and this cost could easily be added into the parameter cb of our model. Thus, the more
sensitive are depositors to the bank’s solvency, the greater the costs to banks of rolling over
nonperforming loans.
Similar observations apply to the parameter cp in our model. We have described this
parameter as a cost imposed by the regulator on troubled banks that have rejected rescue
plans and then are discovered by the regulator. In this case depositors, too, immediately
discover not only the bank’s defaulting loans but also the fact that the bank attempted
to deceive outsiders by hiding these loans. Depositors may react to this deception by
34immediately withdrawing their funds, which could act as an increase to cp. This increase
would have the eﬀect of increasing banks’ willingness to accept rescue plans. Thus, in
countries where discipline exercised by depositors is strong enough, banks may be willing
to accept rescue plans with only small amounts of recapitalization. Discipline exercised by
depositors complements the discipline exercised by the regulatory system.
35A Appendix
A.1 One-bank model
A.1.1 Proof of Lemma 1:
Only low-type banks have a high level of default. If the bank with high default accepts the
plan, its expected utility will be
U(A)=( 1− γ)(R − L)+γp
o(A).
Since acceptance of the plan and revelation of a high level of default signal the bank’s type
with certainty, the market assigns a value of 0 to the reputation term po(A), which is the
conditional probability that the bank is a high type. The bank’s expected utility in the
case where it rejects the plan will be
U(Re) = −(1 − γ)(L + cb + cp)+γp
o(Re)
where we note that po(Re) is also zero since this bank never succeeds with rollover. Since
U(A) >U(Re), the low-type bank will always choose to accept the plan when it has a high
level of default. ￿









pπ(1 − a)+( 1− p)(1 − a)[(1 − π)(1 − θ)+πθ]
=
pπ
pπ +( 1− p)[(1 − π)(1 − θ)+πθ]








pπ +( 1− p)[(1 − π)(1 − θ)+πθ]
36A.1.4Proof of Proposition 1:
Part (i) of the proposition summarizes the discussion of the subsections 3.1 and 3.2. Part
(ii) of the proposition follows from two observations: (1) Ec = cb +( 1−a)cp is decreasing
in a; and (2) cRe(a) and cA(a) are increasing in a. Thus, for given values cb and R, as a
increases, Ec+ R decreases and cRe(a) and cA(a) increase. This implies that the region of
values of Ec+R over which an equilibrium (Re,Re) exists increases with increasing a and
the region of Ec+ R over which an equilibrium (A,A) exists decreases with a. ￿
A.1.5 Proof of Proposition 2:
(i) Conditions for an equilibrium (Re,A):
In this equilibrium the market assumes that the crisis is nonsevere (sets π =0in
updating the bank’s reputation) when the bank rejects a plan. Similarly, the market
assumes that the crisis in severe when the bank accepts a plan.
Two IC conditions must be satisﬁed in order for this equilibrium to exist.
Nonsevere crisis:
U(Re|(Re,A) )=( 1− γ)(￿ B − L − Ec)+γ{ap
+(Re|(Re,A),0 )+( 1− a)[p
m(Re|(Re,A),0)]},
where the last argument of p+(Re|(Re,A),0) indicates that the market infers that the state








The bank’s utility if it accepts the plan is
U(A|(Re,A)) = (1 −γ)(R + ￿ B −L)+γp
m(A | (Re,A),1).
When the bank accepts the plan, the market assumes that the state is s; therefore, it sets
π =1when updating the bank’s repuation.
p
m(A | (Re,A),1) =
p
p+( 1−p)θ






m(A | (Re,A),1)] (5)
That p+(Re|(Re,A),0) ≤ pm(A | (Re,A),1) implies that the RHS of this constraint is
negative, and the constraint cannot be satisﬁed. Hence, the equilibrium (Re,A) does not
exist.
(ii) Conditions for an equilibrium with (A,Re):
Nonsevere crisis:
Tthe bank’s expected utility from accepting the plan is
U(A|(A,Re)) = (1 − γ)(R + ￿ B − L)+γ[p
m(A | (A,Re),0)].
When the bank accepts the plan, the market believes that the state is n, in which case
pm(A | (A,Re),0 )=0 .
The bank’s expected utility from rejecting the plan is
U(Re|(A,Re)) = (1 − γ)(￿ B − L − Ec)+γ[ap
+(Re|(A,Re),π)+( 1− a)p
m(Re|(A,Re),1)].
When the bank rejects the plan then has high current net worth, the market cannot tell
whether the state is n and the bank has no default or whether the state is s. The market’s




p[(1 − π)+πa]+( 1−p)[(1 − π)θ + πθa]
=
p
p +( 1− p)θ
When the bank rejects the plan then reports low current net worth, the market believes




p +( 1− p)θ
The IC condition is












p +( 1− p)θ
] (6)
Severe crisis:
The bank’s expected utilities are as follows:
U(Re|(A,Re)) = (1 − γ)(￿ B − L − Ec)+γ[ap
+(Re|(A,Re),π)+( 1− a)p
m(Re|(A,Re),1)].
U(A|(A,Re)) = (1 − γ)(R + ￿ B − L)+γ[p
m(A | (A,Re),0)].








Comparison of the two IC constraints implies that each must be satisﬁed with equality in
order for the equilibrium to exist. ￿
A.2 Two-bank model
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pπp +( 1− p)2(1 − π)(1 − θ)2
A.2.2 Proof of Proposition 4:
Equilibrium (Re,Re):
The IC constraints are provided in the text.
Deﬁne c1re = RHS of IC constraint (3).
Deﬁne c2re = RHS of IC constraint (4). Deﬁne cRR(a) = min[c1re,c 2re]. Then necessary
and suﬃcient conditions for existence of this equilibrium are: (1) cRR(a) > 0 and (2)
Ec+ R ≤ cRR(a).
Equilibrium (A,A):
Nonsevere crisis; low type
U
L
n(A)=R + ￿ B −L +[ p +( 1− p)θ]p
1m(A|(A,A),π
2+(Re))
+(1 − p)(1 − θ)p
1m(A|(A,A),π
2m(A)).
When Bank 2 rejects the plan and has high current earnings, the market knows that





pπp +( 1− p)2(1 − π)(1 −θ)2
U
L
n(Re) = ￿ B − Ec− L
+[p +( 1− p)θ][ap
1+(Re|(A,A),π
2+(Re)) + (1 −a)p
1m(Re|(A,A),π
2+(Re))]
+(1 − p)(1 − θ)[ap
1+(Re|(A,A),π
2m(A) )+( 1− a)p
1m(Re|(A,A),π
2m(A))
Note that p1m(Re|(A,A),π2+(Re)) = 0 forthe same reason that p1m(A|(A,A),π 2+(Re)) =
0.
40The low type’s incentive compatibility constraint is
Ec+ R ≥ [p +( 1− p)θ]ap
1+(Re|(A,A),π
2+(Re))













since the market knows that the state is n when it observes a bank reject a plan. We may
rewrite the IC constraint as
Ec+ R ≥ ap
1+(Re|(A,A),π
2+(Re)) − (1 − p)(1 − θ)ap
1m(Re|(A,A),π
2m(A))] (8)
Severe crisis; high type
U
H
s (A)=R + ￿ B + p[p
1m(A|(A,A),π
2m(A) )+( 1−p) · 1
U
H
s (Re) = ￿ B − Ec− L + p[ap
1+(Re|(A,A),π
2m(A) )+( 1− a)p
1m(Re|(A,A),π
2m(A))]
+(1 − p)(1 − acp)
The high type’s IC constraint is




2m(A))] − (1 − p)acp (9)
Deﬁne c1A(a)= RHS of IC constraint (8). Deﬁne c2A(a)=RHS of IC constraint (9).
Deﬁne cAA(a)=m ax[c1A(a),c 2A(a)]. A necessary and suﬃcient condition for the existence
of the equilibrium (A,A) is that Ec+ R ≥ cAA(a). ￿
A.2.3 Proof of Proposition 5:
Part (i): Equilibrium (Re,A)
Severe crisis; high-type bank
41Consider Bank 1 and suppose that it is a high type. This bank’s expected utility when
it accepts the plan is given by
U
H
s (A)=R + ￿ B − L + p{p
1m(A|(Re,A),π
2m(A))} +( 1− p)p
1m(A|(Re,A),π
2o(A)).
With probability p Bank 2 is a high type and accepts the plan, in which case p1m(A |
(Re,A),π 2m(A)) will be Bank 1’s updated reputation. Given that acceptance of a plan
by both banks signals to the market that the crisis is severe (since banks with default
reject the plan in a nonsevere crisis), the market knows that Bank 1 is a high type. Hence,
p1m(A | (Re,A),π2m(A) )=1 . With probability (1−p) Bank 2 is a low type and will accept
the plan and report a high level of default. In this case, too, the market will know that
Bank 1 is a high type and will also assign a value of 1 to Bank 1’s updated reputation.
Thus, we may reexpress Bank 1’s expected utility when it accepts the plan as
U
H
s (A)=R + ￿ B −L +1 .
Bank 1’s expected utility if it rejects the plan is given by
U
H
s (Re) = ￿ B − L − Ec+ p[ap
1+(Re|(Re,A),π
2m(A) )+( 1− a)p
1m(Re|(Re,A),π
2m(A))]
+(1 − p)(1 − acp) (10)
Neither of the reputation terms p1+(Re|(Re,A),π2m(A)) or p1m(Re|(Re,A),π2m(A)) can be
calculated via Bayes’ rule. We follow the method discussed earlier in assigning expressions
for these terms. p1+(Re|(Re,A),π2m(A)) is calculated as the probability that Bank 1 is
a high type given that it rejects the plan and has high current net worth and given that




p[πpa+( 1−π)(1 − p)(1 − θ)]






pπp +( 1− p)2(1 − π)(1 − θ)2.
The high type’s incentive compatibility constraint is
Ec+ R ≥ p{ap
1+(Re|(Re,A),π
2m(A) )+( 1− a)p
1m(Re|(Re,A),π
2m(A))}
−p − (1 − p)acp. (11)
42The expression inside the brackets in the RHS of 11 is less than 1; therefore, p{·} is less
than p. The RHS of 11 is negative, and this incentive compatibility constraint is always
satisﬁed.
Nonsevere crisis; low-type bank
Suppose that Bank 1 is a low type and has default. If it rejects the plan, its expected
utility will be given by
U
L
n(Re) = ￿ B − L − Ec+
[p +( 1− p)θ]{ap
1+(Re|(Re,A),π
2+(Re)) + (1 − a)p
1m(Re|(Re,A),π
2+(Re)}
+(1 − p)(1 − θ){a[ap
1+(Re|(Re,A),π





2+(Re)) + (1 − a)p
1m(Re|(Re,A),π
2m(Re))]}.
When the market observes both banks reject the plan, it assumes that the state is n;
thus, when Bank 1 rejects the plan and rollover fails, the market knows that the bank is a low








p +( 1− p)[θ +( 1− θ)a]
.




n(Re) = ￿ B − L − Ec+ ap
1+(Re|(Re,A),π
2+(Re)).
If Bank 1 accepts the plan, its expected utility is
U
L
n(A)=￿ B + R − L +[ p +( 1− p)θ][p
1m(A|(Re,A),π
2+(Re))]
+(1 − p)(1 − θ){ap
1m(A|(Re,A),π
2+(Re)) + (1 −a)p
1m(A|(Re,A),π
2m(Re))}.
We note that p1m(A|(Re,A),π 2+(Re)) and p1m(A|(Re,A),π 2m(Re)) cannot be computed
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A necessary condition for this constraint to be satisﬁed is that the RHS is positive. It
can be shown that the RHS is positive for values of π and θ “low enough” and for values of
a high enough. therefore, the IC constraint will be satisﬁed for values of a high enough and
for values of Ec+R low enough. Thus, suﬃcient conditions for the equilibrium (Re,A) to
exist are that a be high enough and that Ec+R be less than the RHS of constraint 12. An
example of parameter values for which the RHS is positive is p = .6 πo = .5 θ = .3 a = .9.
Part (ii) Equilibrium (A,Re)
Nonsevere crisis; low-type bank
When the low type accepts the plan, its expected utility is
U
L
n (A)=R + ￿ B +( p+( 1− p)θ)p
1m(A|(A,Re),π
2+(Re))
+(1 − p)(1 − θ)p
1m(A|(A,Re),π
2m(A)),
where both of the reputation terms equal zero. Acceptance of the plan signals to the market
that the crisis is severe, in which case only the low type can have default. We may thus
rewrite the expected utility as
U
L
n (A)=R + ￿ B
When the low type rejects the plan, its expected utility is
U
L
n(Re) = ￿ B − Ec+
[p+( 1−p)θ]{ap
1+(Re|(A,Re),π
2+(Re)) + (1 − a)p
1m(Re|(A,Re),π
2+(Re))}
+[(1 − p)(1 −θ)]{ap
1+(Re|(A,Re),π







p(1 −πo)[p+( 1− p)θ]+p2πoa2
(1 − πo)[p +( 1− p)θ]2 + p2πoa2.
When the market observes that both banks reject the plan and one bank has a medium level
of default, the market assumes that the crisis is severe; therefore, p1m(Re|(A,Re),π 2+(Re)) =
1. When the market observes one bank reject the plan and report high current net worth







We must deﬁne the out-of-equilibrium belief for the term p1m(Re|(A,Re),π 2m(A)).We





pπp +( 1− p)2(1 − π)(1 − θ)2
The IC constraint for the low type is
Ec + R ≥ [p +( 1− p)θ]{ap
1+(Re|(A,Re),π
2+(Re)) + (1 − a)}





Severe crisis; high type
When the high type rejects the plan, its expected utility is
U
H
s (Re) = ￿ B − Ec
+p{a[ap
1+(Re|(A,Re),π





2+(Re)) + (1 − a)p
1m(Re|(A,Re),π
2m(Re))]}
+(1 − p)(1 −acp).






45We may thus rewrite the expected utility given that the high type rejects the plan as
U
H
s (Re) = ￿ B − Ec
+p{a[ap
1+(Re|(A,Re),π
2+(Re)) + (1 − a)] + (1 − a)} +( 1−p)(1 − acp)
When the high type accepts the plan, its expected utility is
U
H
s (A)= ￿ B − Ec+ p[ap
1m(A|(A,Re),π




where p1m(A|(A,Re),π2+(Re)) = 0, and where p1m(A|(A,Re),π2m(Re)) is calculated in a
similar manner to the reputation term p1m(Re|(A,Re),π2m(A)) above. (It is easily veriﬁed




s (A)=￿ B − Ec+ p(1 − a)p
1m(A|(A,Re),π
2m(Re)) + (1 − p)
The IC constraint for the high type is
Ec+ R ≤ p{a
2p
1+(Re|(A,Re),π
2+(Re)) + a(1 − a)+( 1− a)}
−p(1 −a)p
1m(A|(A,Re),π
2m(Re)) −(1 − p)acp. (14)
In order to show that the equilibrium (A,Re) does not exist, it suﬃces to demonstrate
that the RHS of IC constraint (13) is greater than the RHS of IC constraint (14); hence,
that the two IC constraints are inconsistent.
Lemma 2 The IC constraint (14) is inconsistent with the IC constraint (13).
Proof: Observe that p1+(Re|(A,Re),π 2+(Re)) >pand p1+(Re|(A,Re),π2m(A)) >p .
Using this observation, we can identify a necessary condition for constraint (13) to be
satisﬁed:
Ec+ R ≥ [p +( 1− p)θ +( 1− p)(1 − θ)]ap+








A necessary condition for the IC constraint (14) to be satisﬁed is that
Ec+ R ≤ ap{ap
1+(Re|(A,Re),π
2+(Re)) + (1 −a)} + p(1 − a)
≤ ap+ p(1 − a). (16)
Conditions (15) and (16) are inconsistent since the RHS of (15) is greater than the RHS
of (16). Hence, the IC constraints (14) and (13) cannot simultaneously be satisﬁed. ￿
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